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Netherlands
Introduction
Migrants have been attracted by the relatively high levels 
of prosperity and religious tolerance in the Netherlands for 
centuries. Currently, immigrants make up 10.8 percent of 
the population, and the children of immigrants make up a 
further 10 percent.
The Dutch long took pride in their country’s tolerance 
towards other cultures and religions. Post-war immigrants, 
especially those who came as guest workers and their 
families, were initially encouraged to maintain their own 
cultures even after it became clear they would stay in the 
Netherlands. Access to citizenship was easy, and pres-
sures to assimilate were low. During the 1990s it became 
clear that the former guest workers and, to a lesser extent, 
immigrants from the former colonies were performing poor-
ly in the labor market. Moreover, the struggles of immigrant 
children in schools caused concern that their low econom-
ic status would continue in the next generation. Lacking 
Dutch proficiency and knowledge of Dutch society were 
seen as important contributors to marginalization. Land-
mark legislation in 1998 introduced an obligation for recent 
migrants to take a “civic integration course” (Inburgering-
scursus) covering Dutch language, culture and society. 
With the turn of the century came a very turbulent time 
for Dutch multiculturalism. A heated public debate emerged 
over (perceived) low levels of integration among long-time 
immigrants and their children.1 The debate covered areas 
such as high unemployment and social welfare use, poor 
performance in school, residential segregation and high 
crime rates. Cultural difference and low Dutch proficiency 
were presented as both a problem in their own right and a 
source of socio-economic disadvantage. 
The electoral success of far-right populist parties since 
2002 contributed to the implementation of several restric-
tive laws. The main goal was to restrict family migration 
and pressure immigrants to learn Dutch. Although there is 
little evidence of the results of compulsory civic integration 
courses, several other European countries have imple-
mented their own versions of this policy. 
Even after the implementation of more restrictive leg-
islation, policies in the Netherlands are still comparatively 
open. Especially political rights and accommodation of mi-
nority religions remain extensive. The Netherlands took the 
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middle road in opening the job market to EU-migrants from 
Central and Eastern Europe (see below). As part of a move 
towards a “modern migration policy” the government is de-
veloping several programs to attract highly skilled workers.
Historical Trends in Immigration  
and Emigration
For centuries, the relative freedom and wealth of the Neth-
erlands have attracted significant flows of immigrants. 
Many Huguenots – Protestants from France - and Jews 
from Southern and Eastern Europe came to the Low Coun-
tries. Between 1590 and 1800 the estimated foreign-born 
population in the Netherlands was never less than five 
percent.7 In the 19th century the foreign-born population 
declined, reaching about two percent in 1880. From 1870, 
there were more people leaving than entering the country. 
After the Second World War, the government encouraged 
emigration because it feared that the high birth-rate would 
create unemployment. During the 1950s, roughly 350,000 
people emigrated. Canada and Australia were the most 
popular destinations, followed by the U.S., South Africa 
and New Zealand.8 
In 1960 immigration again came to exceed emigration. 
Post-war immigration was dominated by people from the 
(former) colonies and from guest worker recruitment coun-
tries. When the Dutch colony of Indonesia claimed inde-
pendence in 1945, two groups of migrants came to the 
Netherlands: about 300,000 Dutch-Indonesian repatriates 
and 12,500 Malukans.9 In 1975, Suriname, a small Dutch 
colony just north of Brazil, gained independence. By the 
time the Netherlands introduced a visa requirement for Su-
rinamese in 1980, nearly half the population had migrated 
to the Netherlands. 
The Netherlands Antilles, a group of small Caribbean 
islands that have remained part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, are another important source of migrants. 
Like upper-class Surinamese, upper-class Antilleans have 
long come to the Netherlands to study. When the economic 
situation on the islands became precarious in the 1990s, 
more and more lower class Antilleans moved to the “moth-
er country.” These migrants often struggle to find their way 
in the Netherlands, which has led to an increase in return 
migration. 
Post-War Migration
Like other Western European countries, the Netherlands 
recruited guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s; the 
Netherlands signed agreements with Italy (1960), Spain 
(1961), Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1967), 
Morocco (1969), Yugoslavia (1970) and Tunisia (1971). 
Turkey, Morocco and Spain were the most important send-
ing countries. Guest workers from Southern Europe mostly 
returned to their home countries – especially after Spain 
and Portugal joined the EU. Return migration to Turkey 
and Morocco was less common because the economic 
and political situation in these countries remained poor 
and re-entering the Netherlands or other European coun-
tries became more difficult for non EU-citizens. After the 
recruitment stop in 1975, many guest workers decided to 
prolong their stay in the Netherlands and were joined by 
their families. Family reunification peaked around 1980. 
Initially this process met resistance from the government 
and society because of the housing shortage the Nether-
lands was facing. Nevertheless, in the early 1980s family 
reunification regulations were relaxed. As a consequence 
of family reunification, family formation,10 and childbirth, 
the Moroccan and Turkish origin populations have shown 
a strong increase in size. From 1975 to 2014 the Turkish 
origin population grew from about 55,639 to 396,414 and 
the Moroccan origin population from 30,481 to 374,996.11 
Recent Developments in Immigration and 
Emigration
From 1960 until 2003,12 the number of immigrants exceed-
ed the number of emigrants. Between 2003 and 2007 a 
simultaneous increase in emigration and decrease in im-
migration led to a negative migration balance (see Figure 
1). From 2003 onward, well over 100,000 people a year 
left the Netherlands. About a third of these emigrants were 
Dutch-born. Native Dutch mostly emigrate to neighboring 
Germany and Belgium or other European countries.
The drop in immigration from 2003 was mostly due to a 
drop in asylum and family migration. The increase in immi-
gration from 2007 was mainly driven by an increase in la-
bor migration. Since 2010 immigration has topped 150,000 
people a year. 
Until 2007 family migration was the main source of mi-
gration to the Netherlands,13 accounting for almost 40 per-
cent of all immigrants. Since 2007, labor migrants make up 
the largest group. The shift in migration types and increase 
in overall immigration were mainly driven by migration from 
Central and Eastern European countries that joined the 
European Union (EU) in 2004 and 2007. “Old” EU Mem-
ber States14 are allowed to put a maximum of seven years 
restriction on the freedom of movement from new Member 
States. The Netherlands fully opened its borders to citi-
zens of the 2004-accession countries15 in May 2007. Be-
cause migrants from the new Member States do not need a 
residence permit and often do not register with the munici-
pal authorities (in part because many are seasonal work-
ers, employed in agriculture or construction) it is difficult 
to know exactly how many of them are in the Netherlands. 
Estimates by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) suggest that 
the number of migrants from the new Member States in-
creased from just below 100,000 in 2007 to about 250,000 
in 2012. In this same period the number of migrants from 
the old Member States increased only from 335,000 to 
350,000. Polish migrants are the most prominent group; 
they make up about 70 percent of all migrants from the 
new Member States. The large flow of migrants from the 
2004-accession countries, led the government to place the 
maximum restriction period on the freedom of movement 
from Bulgaria and Romania.16 Even though the restrictions 
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on free movement from these two countries were only lifted 
in 2014, Statistics Netherlands estimates that by the end 
of 2012 already more than 30,000 people from these two 
countries were living in the Netherlands. 
Immigration Policy
Aliens Act of 2000
In 2001 the Aliens Act of 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000, 
Vw 2000), came into effect. This law brought about ma-
jor changes in refugee and asylum procedures (see be-
low). During the 1990s politicians had become increasingly 
concerned with the large numbers of migrants arriving for 
the purpose of family formation. Some of these marriag-
es were “fake”; contracted for no other purpose than to 
obtain a visa. There were also concerns about the high 
share of children of – particularly Turkish and Moroccan 
- immigrants marrying partners from the origin countries 
of their parents. Since these marriage migrants were of-
ten low-skilled there were fears that they would lead to a 
continuation of socio-economic marginality into the next 
generation. The law therefore raised the bar for marriage 
migration. 
The minimum income that a Dutch citizen or resident 
must have in order to sponsor a family migrant was raised 
to at least 100 percent of the minimum family income (or 
120 percent in case of non-permanent residents).17  In ad-
dition sponsors must have an employment contract for at 
least one year and be at least 21 years of age. The spouse 
who comes to the Netherlands has to be at least 21. Since 
1998 the spouse must await a permit outside of the Neth-
erlands. An exception is made for spouses from the US, 
Japan, Switzerland, Australia, and EU and EEA Member 
States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). These excep-
tions are based on bilateral treaties, but they also reflect 
the fear that people from other countries are more likely 
to be economic immigrants who 
use marriage as a way to enter 
the country. In 2004 the mini-
mum income requirement for 
family formation was raised from 
100 percent to 120 percent of the 
minimum family income. In 2010 
the European Court of Justice 
ruled18 that this was unreason-
ably high and the requirement 
was brought back down to 100 
percent.
Law on Civic Integration 
Abroad
In 2006 the law on “civic integra-
tion abroad” (Wet Inburgering 
Buitenland, Wib) came into force. 
Those who want to come to the 
Netherlands for the purposes of family migration (forma-
tion or reunification) now need to pass a Dutch language 
and culture proficiency test in the country of residence. Cit-
izens of EU and EEA Member States, Switzerland, Mona-
co, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States, Japan 
and South Korea are exempted. In 2011 the Administrative 
High Court ruled that as a consequence of the association 
treaty between Turkey and the EU, Turkish nationals and 
their family members are also exempt. 
As part of the study material, applicants can buy a video 
entitled “Coming to the Netherlands”. This video, which 
includes images of gay men kissing and topless women 
lying on the beach, was very controversial when it was in-
troduced, because it seemed designed to provoke Muslim 
migrants and not everybody considers homosexuality and 
topless sunbathing to be core Dutch values. 
After restrictions on family migration were implemented, 
numbers initially dropped significantly.20 Since 2007 the 
numbers have increased again, but this is mainly due to 
migrants from the new EU Member States.21 Dutch resi-
dents of Turkish and Moroccan origin increasingly find a 
spouse from the local co-ethnic community rather than 
from the origin country of their parents.22 
Attracting Highly-Qualified Migrants
The government has been working to improve access for 
highly skilled workers. Special entry regulations for knowl-
edge workers were introduced in 2004. Employees of com-
panies who have signed an agreement with the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (IND) qualify for fast-track 
admission. Knowledge workers are exempted from the civ-
ic integration requirement. Since 2006 academic research-
ers and medical doctors training to specialize do not need 
to meet an income requirement; it is sufficient to show they 
have means of subsistence and work at a recognized insti-
tution. In 2007 the income requirement for foreigners with 
a degree from a Dutch university who find high-skilled em-
ployment was lowered.23 From 2008 to 2011 23,390 knowl-
Figure 1: Immigration and emigration, 1960-2013
Source: CBS
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edge workers and 2,400 foreigners who studied at Dutch 
universities received residence permits. A program to at-
tract graduates from the top-200 ranked universities in the 
world24 has been largely unsuccessful; between 2009 and 
2012 fewer than 500 permits were granted.
Immigrant Population
Defining Allochtonen and Autochtonen
Statistics on the immigrant population in the Netherlands 
are based on ethnicity which is measured as (parental) 
country of birth. Information on parental country of birth is 
collected in the municipal registration system (gemeenteli-
jke basisadministratie, GBA). Dutch statistics distinguish 
between allochtonen and autochtonen.25 Autochtonen are 
native Dutch; people with two Dutch-born parents. Alloch-
tonen are officially defined as persons who have at least 
one parent who was born outside the Netherlands. A fur-
ther distinction is made between Western and non-Western 
allochtonen. Western allochtonen are people from Europe 
(excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia 
and Japan. Non-Western allochtonen are people from Tur-
key, Africa, Latin American and the rest of Asia. Many sta-
tistics differentiate between allochtonen and autochtonen 
(and often further differentiate between individual ethnic 
groups). Most statistics, and research based on them, fo-
cus in particular on the non-Western group, as they are 
seen as the ones with the most disadvantaged position 
in Dutch society. In everyday usage the term allochtonen 
tends to denote the non-Western group, and more specifi-
cally Turks and Moroccans. 
Composition of the Immigrant Population
Because naturalization rates are generally high and differ 
across origin groups, data on allochtonen present a dif-
ferent view of the immigrant origin population than data 
on foreigners. 21.4 percent of the Dutch population is 
allochtoon (11.9 percent non-Western), 10.8 percent is 
foreign-born and 4.75 percent of the population does not 
possess Dutch citizenship. The ten largest groups make 
up two-thirds of the total allochtoon population. The top-10 
is made up of groups originating from (former) colonies, 
guest worker recruitment countries, and three neighbor-
ing countries, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom 
(see Figure 2). Taken together, people born in EU Member 
States and their children make up 27.4 percent of the al-
lochtoon population. 
The top-10 of foreign nationals26 does not include any 
former colonial groups. This is to be expected as these 
migrants were often Dutch nationals at the time of migra-
tion. Instead, in addition to the former guest worker recruit-
ment countries Morocco and Turkey it includes several EU 
countries and the U.S. (see Figure 3). According to data 
from Statistics Netherlands, there are nationals from 190 
different countries living in the Netherlands.27
Spatial Distribution
The immigrant population tends to live in urban areas. 
Nearly 30 percent of allochtonen (38 percent of all non-
Figure 2: Top-10 groups of ‘allochtonen’, 2014
Source: CBS
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Western allochtonen) live in the four largest cities (Am-
sterdam, Rotterdam, the Hague and Utrecht), compared 
to 8.9 percent of the autochtoon Dutch population. In Am-
sterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague, allochtonen make up 
around half of the population. Some smaller municipalities 
also have a high concentration of certain groups, mostly 
as a consequence of the presence of industries that em-
ployed guest workers. Within cities there are high levels of 
segregation: many immigrants live in neighborhoods with a 
low percentage of autochtonen.28 
Integration Policy
1960-1997: Culture as an Asset
Initially both the Dutch government and immigrants be-
lieved that their stay in the Netherlands would be tempo-
rary.29 Given this “myth of return”, it was considered un-
necessary to fully integrate migrants into Dutch society; 
thus the government only aimed to provide them with good 
living conditions. Guest workers were allowed to make use 
of all of the regular provisions of the welfare state. Addi-
tionally, cultural and social facilities were set up. The chil-
dren of guest workers could take special mother tongue 
classes. All measures were aimed at making the transition 
back “home” as smooth as possible. 
System of pillarization
This provision of support for cultural maintenance fitted 
with the Dutch principle of “sovereignty in one’s own cir-
cle”, which was part of the system of “pillarization” (ver-
zuiling). This Dutch political system took hold in the first 
half of the 20th century and accorded each religious faith, 
and later the secular socialist and liberal groups, their own 
“pillar”. The pillars had an elaborate infrastructure that 
encompassed most of public life including trade unions, 
newspapers, sport clubs, undertakers and, for the Chris-
tian groups, schools.30 The Netherlands has rapidly secu-
larized since the Second World War, but the institutional 
structures of pillarization are still in place. 
Multiculturalism
In the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a growing 
realization that immigrants would stay in the Netherlands. 
There were also concerns that many of the members of the 
largest migrant groups had a weak socio-economic posi-
tion; unemployment was well-above that of native Dutch 
and the children of migrants performed poorly in school. In 
the early 1980s the ethnic minority policy was introduced 
with the later infamous slogan of “integration with the pres-
ervation of migrants’ own identities.” The maintenance of 
immigrant cultures was no longer seen as a means of fa-
cilitating return to the countries of origin, but as a road 
to emancipation, similar to the one the Catholic minority 
had followed. There was generous state support for im-
migrants’ social and cultural life; there were consultative 
councils for ethnic minorities at the local and national level; 
mother-tongue teaching was introduced in primary schools. 
The first Muslim and Hindu schools were erected using 
laws from the time of pillarization. Aside from stimulating 
integration through cultural activities, the policy aimed at 
equality before the law and equal opportunity in the labor 
market, housing market and education.
Figure 3: Top-10 foreign nationals and dual nationals, 2012
Source: CBS
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Change of policy
In the 1990s, it became clear that the socio-economic 
position of the four main non-Western immigrant groups 
(Turks, Surinamese, Moroccans and Antilleans) remained 
poor and minority youth were overrepresented in crime 
statistics. The policy focus therefore shifted from cultural 
preservation to labor market integration and equal oppor-
tunities. Mother-tongue teaching was limited and made ex-
tra-curricular, and the importance of education and learn-
ing Dutch were stressed. The change in integration policy 
was part of a larger change in discourse on state policy 
from the rights of citizens to the duties of citizens. In the 
1980s and 1990s the welfare state was facing a crisis: the 
number of people on welfare had become too large rela-
tive to the working population, the welfare system needed 
a reform. A poor socio-economic position was increasingly 
seen as a result of people’s actions rather than a lack of 
opportunities. This new emphasis on people’s own respon-
sibilities also spread to the field of immigrant integration. 
1998-2014: Culture as a Problem
As early as 1989, the Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regerings-
beleid, WRR) recommended language training programs 
for newly arrived immigrants to support their integration. 
It was however not until 1998 that the law on the civic 
integration of newcomers (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers, 
WIN) was introduced. The law required all new immigrants 
aged 18-65 – with the exception of students and tempo-
rary workers – to take 600 hours of language and societal 
orientation classes. Citizens of the EU, the EEA, Switzer-
land and the U.S. who came for reasons other than mar-
riage or family reunification were exempted. The program 
was meant to help immigrants find their way in Dutch so-
ciety and become self-supporting. If new immigrants did 
not comply, their social security could be cut or they could 
be fined. 
Since the introduction, the law has been amended 
several times, increasingly turning civic integration into a 
mechanism to discipline immigrants. Since 2007 new im-
migrants no longer have an obligation to attend a civic in-
tegration course, instead they must pass a civic integration 
exam to qualify for a permanent residence permit. This re-
quirement does not apply to citizens of the EU, EEA, Swit-
zerland and Turkey.
Migrants have to pay for any course needed to prepare 
for the exam. They can borrow money from the govern-
ment for this purpose. In 2007 a civic integration duty (in-
burgeringsplicht) for permanent resident foreigners who 
arrived before 1998 (oudkomers) and who have not at-
tended education in the Netherlands was introduced. This 
extended integration obligation is mostly aimed at people 
on welfare and spiritual leaders such as imams. The civic 
integration exam must be passed within five years after an 
oudkomer has been summoned by the municipality. If s/he 
fails the test, s/he can be fined. 
Right-wing populism on the rise
The process of imposing increasing restrictions on family 
migration (see above) and pressures on Dutch language 
acquisition that had started in the 1990s accelerated after 
electoral success of populist far-right parties from 2002 
onwards. There have been anti-immigrant parties in the 
Netherlands since the 1980s, but these parties initially re-
mained marginal. While the general public grew annoyed 
with the poor Dutch proficiency and perceived lacking cul-
tural adaptation of many of the former guest workers and 
their families, as well as the alleged delinquency of their 
children, few politicians responded to these complaints.31 
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, several Islamo-
phobic incidents occurred. At that time a new politician 
entered the public arena: Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn was fairly 
well-known for his column in the right-wing magazine El-
sevier, in which he agitated against immigrants and what 
he regarded as lenient government policies. Rather than 
using the nuanced discourse of the political establish-
ment, Fortuyn expressed himself boldly, calling Islam a 
“backward religion”, and saying that the “leftwing church” 
had pampered immigrants at the expense of native Dutch. 
He argued that the Netherlands should close its borders 
to all immigrants, including refugees, until those already 
present in the country were fully integrated. This was re-
ceived by many as a welcome reaction to years of political 
correctness. It was often stated that Fortuyn “said what 
people had been thinking all along”. 
Fortuyn’s political career came to a tragic end when 
he was assassinated by an environmental activist on 6th 
May 2002, one week prior to the general elections. In 
the elections the Christen Democratisch Appel (Christian 
Democrats, CDA) won the most seats, but even without 
its leader, Fortuyn’s party, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (List Pim 
Fortuyn, LPF) came in second with 17.6 percent of the 
votes. These two parties along with the right-wing liberal 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy, VVD) formed a short-lived co-
alition government. The LPF lost most of its seats in the 
2003 elections, and after the 2006 elections disappeared 
from parliament. The discourse on immigrants in general – 
and Muslim immigrants in particular – however, remained 
ferocious. 
In November 2004 a young Moroccan-Dutch extrem-
ist Muslim murdered filmmaker Theo van Gogh.32 In re-
sponse, several mosques were set on fire. In that same 
year Geert Wilders left the VVD in a dispute over negotiat-
ing EU-accession with Turkey - Wilders was fiercely op-
posed - and started the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for 
Freedom, PVV). Wilders has made very strong statements 
against Muslims, warning about a “tsunami of islamiza-
tion” hitting the Netherlands, calling the Quran a “fascist 
book” and suggesting a tax on headscarves (kopvodden-
tax). After gaining 5.9 percent of the vote in the 2006 par-
liamentary elections, party support jumped to 15.5 percent 
in the 2010 elections. The media uncovered problematic 
pasts33 of several of the new PVV parliamentarians and 
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in the 2012 elections the party dropped to 10.1 percent of 
the votes. Wilders remains very prominent in Dutch poli-
tics and media. Politicians from other parties struggle to 
deal with him. Wilders continues to express his disdain 
of Islam and Muslim migrants – especially from Morocco. 
In recent years he has also become vocally opposed to 
migration from the new EU Member States and the EU as 
a whole. In early 2012 the PVV announced a “hotline for 
Central and Eastern-Europe” (meldpunt Midden- en Oost-
Europeanen) that people could call to file their complaints 
about nuisance caused by Central and Eastern European 
migrants (CEE). Embassies of the countries concerned 
objected to the hotline, but the government did not inter-
vene. While the hotline received nearly 40,000 complaints 
about CEE migrants, a newspaper revealed that 135,000 
calls to the hotline concerned complaints about the exis-
tence of the hotline and the PVV.34 The hotline has since 
been closed.
Focus on Muslim migrants
Most of the current debate surrounding immigrants and 
integration center on Muslims. There is a widespread 
fear that some immigrant groups’ views on gender roles, 
gay rights and the role of religion in society are at odds 
with those of the liberal mainstream in the Netherlands. 
Throughout the post-war period, cultural belonging and 
difference have been important concepts in policies and 
political debates on immigrant integration. Dutch society’s 
views of immigrants’ cultures have, however, changed. 
Culture has come to be seen as something that holds 
people back, and civic integration courses are thus aimed 
at correcting this by mandating that immigrants adopt 
Dutch culture. There is a near parliamentary-wide con-
sensus that immigrants can – and should – be obliged 
to learn Dutch and accept certain liberal-democratic val-
ues. Rather than supporting immigrant culture with public 
funds, policies are increasingly aimed at surveying immi-
grants’ conformity to what is perceived as Dutch culture. 
Policies and discourse have shifted from treating migrants 
as objects in need of care and support to overcome their 
disadvantaged position to objects of sanctions to correct 
behavior that is seen as the cause of their own problems 
and those of society. 
Despite a change in rhetoric about immigrant integra-
tion since the early 2000s, changes to policies were initial-
ly limited. It remains possible to set up publicly funded re-
ligious primary and secondary schools – including Islamic 
schools. Public support for broadcasting by religion-based 
broadcasting corporations that air programs on the pub-
lic channels was available until 2013. In 2004, a Muslim 
council (Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, CMO) and 
a Chinese council were added to the range of ethnic con-
sultative bodies that can advise the government on poli-
cies related to immigrants. Only in 2015 will government 
subsidies for the consultative bodies and their member 
organizations end. 
Citizenship
The Netherlands has a comparatively open citizenship pol-
icy. Since 1953, third generation migrants (i.e. the grand-
children of immigrants) receive Dutch citizenship at birth. 
In 1985, the Netherlands introduced a new citizenship 
law that replaced the law of 1892. The law introduced an 
option-right to Dutch nationality for Dutch born children of 
immigrants (the second generation) between the ages of 
18 and 25. In amendments that came into effect in 2003 
the age-limit was removed, but the option right was made 
conditional on the outcome of a public order investigation.
Immigrants can naturalize after five years of legal resi-
dence, or three if they are married to a Dutch citizen. Until 
2003 the naturalization requirements were minimal: appli-
cants had to show that they had no serious criminal record 
and complete a modest oral exam to test their Dutch lan-
guage ability. This exam usually involved a civil servant 
asking the candidate to state their name, place of birth, ad-
dress and year of immigration in Dutch. The low threshold 
to naturalization was a deliberate choice. The government 
believed that it was important for the immigrant popula-
tion to have equal rights, and awarding citizenship was 
seen as a good way of ensuring this.35 Naturalization was 
perceived as an important step towards integration. In the 
1980s and 1990s the government organized campaigns to 
encourage immigrants to naturalize.
Legally resident foreigners have several rights that oth-
er countries usually reserve for citizens. Since 1985 for-
eigners have been allowed to work in the civil service, with 
the exception of the police force and the army. After five 
years of legal residence, foreigners have the right to vote 
and stand for election in local elections. 
Dual Citizenship
Dual citizenship was introduced in January 1992, which 
led to an increase in naturalizations. Dual citizenship was 
highly contested, and in October 1997 it was withdrawn. 
As a consequence there was a drop in the naturalization 
rate,36 from a peak of 10.9 percent in 1996 to 8.2 percent 
in 1998 (see Figure 4). There are several exemptions to 
the renunciation obligation, and the law is not applied very 
rigidly. Dual nationality is still often granted. The number of 
dual nationals has continued to rise from 600,000 in 1998 
to 1.3 million in 2014 (see Figure 4). The continuing rise of 
dual citizenship is not only due to ongoing exemptions, but 
also a product of previous policies. Parents who previously 
became dual citizens can pass on both citizenships.
Tightening Access to Citizenship
In line with the stricter approach toward immigrant integra-
tion in general, citizenship requirements have been tight-
ened. Granting citizenship is no longer seen as a means 
of facilitating integration, but more as a reward that should 
only be given to people who have proven that they have 
successfully integrated. To test the level of integration, a 
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formal naturalization test was introduced in 2003. This writ-
ten exam tests both the applicant’s language proficiency 
and his/her knowledge of Dutch culture and society. The 
introduction of the test led to a decrease in naturalizations. 
In 2005 the naturalization rate was 3.1 percent, which is 
still high compared to other European countries. It has re-
mained stable ever since. Since 2007, people who passed 
the civic integration exam no longer have to do a natu-
ralization test.37 In 2008 “naturalization ceremonies” were 
introduced. These ceremonies are held on national natu-
ralization day (December 15th) and on other days selected 
by municipalities. Applicants for Dutch citizenship have to 
attend these ceremonies and declare their allegiance to 
the Netherlands (verklaring van verbondenheid).
Immigrant Integration
Non-Western allochtoon groups are generally in a disad-
vantaged socio-economic position. Although there have 
been improvements over time, particularly for the second 
generation in education and the labor market performance, 
significant gaps remain. Of the four largest non-Western 
immigrant groups, Moroccans are the group that is per-
forming worst but is also the group has showing the stron-
gest improvements in education among the second gen-
eration. Of the smaller communities, Somalis stand out for 
suffering from very high unemployment, welfare depen-
dency and high crime rates among young Somali boys.38 
Chinese and Iranians immigrants and their children on the 
other hand do very well both in education and the labor 
market.
Labor Market
In 2012, unemployment among non-Western allochtonen 
was 16 percent of those participating in the labor market, 
compared to 5 percent among autochtoon Dutch. Unem-
ployment was particularly high among Somali (37 percent), 
Afghan (21 percent) and Iraqi (20 
percent) migrants. Since the begin-
ning of the 2008 economic crisis im-
migrant groups have suffered a larger 
increase in unemployment than native 
Dutch.39 Youth unemployment among 
immigrant groups has reached 28 per-
cent and even as much 37 percent for 
Moroccan origin 15-24 year olds. This 
gap can only partially be explained by 
differences in education, grades and 
region of residence. Part of the gap 
may be due to differences in job hunt-
ing behavior and social networks,40 but 
a study from 2007 found evidence of 
ethnic discrimination by employers.41 
Although unemployment levels remain 
comparatively high, there has been an 
increase of the share of allochtonen 
working in occupations that require 
at higher education (so-called Hogere 
beroepen which are occupations that 
normally require at least a bachelor’s degree (HBO or uni-
versiteit). Of the second generation nearly 30 percent work 
in a higher level occupation, which is close to the level of 
native Dutch.42
Education
The education level among the second generation shows 
a significant improvement compared to their parents and 
over time. Performance in elementary school has improved 
and an increasing share of the second generation attends 
the two highest tiers of secondary education (HAVO/
VWO)43. The increased participation in higher education 
is especially notable. In 2011 the share of non-Western 
allochtonen starting higher education (hogeschool or uni-
versiteit) was 53 percent up from 43 percent in 2003, com-
pared to an increase from 53 to 58 percent for autochtoon 
Dutch. People of Surinamese and Antillean origin perform 
almost at par with autochtoon Dutch. Turkish and Moroc-
can origin women show a strong increase in participation in 
higher education from about 30 percent in 2003 to close to 
50 percent in 2011. A much stronger increase than among 
men: 34 to 37 percent for Moroccan origin and 26 to 39 for 
Turkish origin men. 
Increased enrollment in higher education is, however, 
only part of the story. Drop-out rates from high school and 
vocational tertiary education continue to be high among 
non-Western groups. While also here there have been im-
provements over time, less than half of 20-35 year olds of 
Turkish or Moroccan origin have a degree from the aca-
demic tiers of secondary school or a tertiary degree that 
is considered a starting point for entering the labor mar-
ket (startkwalificatie). The degree completion rate among 
non-Western immigrant groups in higher education is lower 
than that of native Dutch. Of those who started their stud-
ies in 2003, 75 percent of native and 60 percent of non-
Western migrant origin students obtained their bachelor’s 
degree within eight years.44 
Figure 4: Naturalization rate and number of dual nationals   
                       (includes dual nationality acquired at birth)
Source: CBS
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Crime Rates
Crime levels have been decreasing for all origin groups. 
However, the relative overrepresentation of Moroccan and 
Antillean origin youths has been increasing. Sixty-five per-
cent of Moroccan-Dutch and 55 percent of Antillean-Dutch 
boys have been apprehended between the ages of 12 and 
23, compared to 25 percent of autochtoon Dutch boys.45 
The high crime rates figure prominently in public debates. 
These differences are only in part due to socio-economic 
differences, racial profiling46 by the police may also play a 
role.
Political Participation
The political participation of immigrants is high compared 
to other countries. Though the percentage of voters is 
lower than among autochtonen, there are a considerable 
number of allochtoon politicians. Out of the 150 members 
of parliament, 14 are of non-Western immigrant origin – 
mostly Turkish. In the 2010 local elections, 303 council-
ors (or three percent) of immigrant origin were elected. 
Although this number does not yet represent the share of 
the immigrant population, it is a good record compared to 
neighboring countries. More than half of these 303 local 
councilors are of Turkish origin.47
Irregular Migration
It was estimated that in 2009 there were between 60,667 
and 133,624 irregular migrants in the Netherlands.48 This 
is a considerable drop from the estimates of 150,000 to 
200,000 irregular migrants for the period 1997–2003. Ir-
regular migrants come from countries with long-standing 
migration to the Netherlands such as Turkey and Morocco, 
refugee sending countries and countries that have more 
recently started sending labor migrants to the Netherlands 
such as Ukraine and the Philippines.49
The drop in the number of appre-
hended irregular migrants since 2003 
is partly due to EU enlargement; mi-
grants from Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries who were previously 
irregular now enjoy the right to free 
movement.50 Until 2004, Europeans 
made up about a third of apprehend-
ed irregular migrants.
In the late 1990s there were many 
protests by so-called “white illegals” 
(witte illegalen), people who were liv-
ing in the Netherlands without a resi-
dence permit but were employed and 
paid taxes. Several hundred of these 
“white illegals” were later granted res-
idence permits. The 1998 Linking Act 
(koppelingswet) restricted the ability 
of irregular migrants to pursue regu-
lar employment. The act linked the 
databases of several government in-
stitutions (tax authorities, immigration services, municipali-
ties), so that irregular immigrants could be easily excluded 
from public services and prevented from being issued a 
social security number (a prerequisite for regular employ-
ment, social security benefits and subsidized housing). 
The law does allow access to education for children under 
18 and people with “imperative” medical needs access to 
treatment. Further control measures focus on employers. 
The police perform regular inspections in sectors that are 
known to employ irregular migrants, such as agriculture 
and food services. Employers who are caught employing 
irregular migrants can be fined.
While staying in the Netherlands without authorization 
is not a crime, irregular migrants who end up in police cus-
tody can be detained in deportation centers if the authori-
ties believe that they can be deported in the near future. 
Refuge and Asylum
Soldiers from Eastern European countries such as Poland, 
who had helped liberate the Netherlands and subsequently 
decided to stay when their countries of origin came under 
communist regimes, were among the first post-war refu-
gees. They were later joined by compatriots fleeing those 
regimes, as well as refugees from around the world. The 
Netherlands accepts approximately 500 refugees a year 
who have been selected for resettlement from UN refugee 
camps. Currently, the major refugee communities are from 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Bosnia.
Numbers
For many years the Netherlands received a relatively high 
number of asylum seekers.51 In the second half of the 
1980s, the number of asylum seekers increased rapidly. In 
1980, 1,330 people claimed asylum in the Netherlands; in 
1990 this number had risen to 21,210. However, the rise 
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in applications did not mean a rise in the number of refu-
gee permits granted (see Figure 5). From 1987 to 1996, 
40 percent of claimants were granted a permit. During the 
1980s and 1990s several regulations were implemented to 
discourage people from coming to the Netherlands to claim 
asylum. These regulations were not very successful in low-
ering the inflow of asylum seekers; their number peaked in 
1994 at over 50,000.
Legal Framework
Refuge and asylum in the Netherlands is governed by the 
Aliens Act of 2000  (Vw 2000). Under this act, asylum seek-
ers can be granted refugee status if they meet the criteria 
of the Geneva Convention on humanitarian grounds, or if 
they are the dependent partner or minor child who fled to-
gether with or within three months of a principal applicant. 
To decrease the previously long processing times, the 
Vw 2000 introduced a “48-hour assessment”. Within 48 
working hours from application, a first decision is made 
on whether or not a person can be considered for refugee 
status. The 48-hour assessment is also meant as a deter-
rent for bogus applicants. During the application process, 
asylum seekers are housed at special reception centers 
scattered throughout the country, where they can wait for 
the outcome of their application and appeals. Asylum seek-
ers get a small weekly allowance and are not allowed to 
work for more than twelve weeks a year.
After the implementation of the Vw 2000, applications 
dropped from 43,560 in 2000 to 9,780 in 2004. It is dif-
ficult to tell whether this is a consequence of the policy, a 
decrease in conflict, or an economic downturn. In recent 
years, the number of asylum requests has once again ris-
en. In the first six months of 2014, the Netherlands has 
registered the largest number of asylum seekers since the 
first half of 2001; most asylum claims were made by Syr-
ians and Eritreans. 
People granted refugee status receive a renewable resi-
dence permit which is valid for one year. After five years, 
refugees are eligible for a permanent residence permit on 
the condition that they pass the civic integration exam. If 
they have not passed the exam, they receive another tem-
porary permit. People who are granted refugee status are 
housed throughout the country to spread the costs of re-
ception across municipalities and prevent geographic con-
centration. Every municipality has to reserve a share of its 
social housing for refugees. It is estimated that almost two-
thirds of the refugee population live outside the large urban 
centers. However, many try to move to the cities eventu-
ally, to join compatriots, or because they believe that they 
will have more opportunities there. 
Deportation
The Netherlands does not have a strict removal policy for 
asylum seekers whose applications were denied. It is the 
unsuccessful claimant’s responsibility to leave the country. 
Many people who were denied refugee status consequent-
ly stayed on without a legal residence permit, and in 2007, 
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after lengthy debates, the government passed an amnes-
ty law for all asylum seekers who claimed asylum before 
2001 unsuccessfully but had not left the Netherlands since 
and had not committed any serious crimes.52 Nearly 30,000 
people have been granted a permit as a result of this law. 
Current Developments and Future  
Challenges
Following the policy path of the past 15 years in which the 
rights of immigrants have become increasingly conditional 
on successful integration, the government recently intro-
duced a proposal to increase the residence requirement 
for naturalization from five to seven years. A vote is ex-
pected to take place in late 2014. While there have been 
debates about further raising the requirements for family 
migration, policy changes are unlikely because they will 
conflict with the EU Family Reunification Directive. 
Policy changes are not uniformly restrictive. The gov-
ernment is increasingly trying to attract highly skilled work-
ers. In June 2013, the law on a Modern Migration Policy 
(wet Modern Migratiebeleid, MoMi) came into effect. The 
Netherlands is trying to improve its attractiveness to highly 
skilled migrants by streamlining visa application proce-
dures and providing access to those with degrees from top 
universities.
Debate on Immigration: A Turning Point?
While the recession has replaced immigration as main pub-
lic concern, emotional debates about immigrant integration 
are ongoing. Under the guise of freedom of expression, 
people present their views on “the problem with (Muslim) 
immigrants” in often disparaging terms. Immigrants and 
their descendants feel societal acceptance of migrants has 
decreased.53 Social contacts between immigrants and na-
tives have decreased between 1994 and 201154. It is un-
clear whether this is a product of the growing size of im-
migrant groups or of avoidance. There are some signs that 
the ferocity of the immigration debate has passed its peak. 
In March of 2014, Wilders suffered a public backlash at a 
post-municipal election event when he got his audience 
chanting “fewer, fewer” in response to his question wheth-
er they would like more or fewer Moroccans in the Nether-
lands. Several representatives left the party. It is too early 
to gauge the long-term effect on party support, but the re-
sponse by a right-wing paper (de Telegraaf)55 suggests a 
turning point may have been reached. Furthermore, in the 
past few years the share of native Dutch who believe there 
are too many migrants in the Netherlands has decreased. 
Non-Western immigrant groups have made gains in 
educational and labor market achievement. Nevertheless 
Dutch residents of non-Western origin still underperform 
compared to Dutch natives, especially in the labor mar-
ket. While exact reasons for this underperformance are 
unknown, discrimination is likely to be a contributing fac-
tor. Awareness of labor market discrimination is increas-
ing. While the Netherlands has long had extensive anti-
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discrimination legislation, the government has done little to 
combat the more subtle forms of discrimination that occur 
in the labor market or in nightlife. 
Immigration from EU Member States
The growing presence of migrants from the new-EU Mem-
ber States has attracted a range of concerns. There are 
problems with the housing of migrants who do seasonal 
and low skilled labor. The workers often live in overcrowd-
ed accommodation and are being exploited by landlords 
and employers. Municipal governments are trying to com-
bat overcrowding and rogue landlords. While the labor 
market participation of this group is very high, recent in-
creases in benefit claims have caused alarm among politi-
cians. There is very little evidence to suggest that welfare 
dependence is a (structural) problem among this group, 
but the experience with the guest worker communities has 
made politicians wary of problems in this area. There is a 
rise of crime suspects from Central and Eastern European 
countries; however this mainly concerns people who come 
to the Netherlands with the aim to commit criminal acts 
rather than labor migrants.57 Finally there are concerns 
that, like previous waves of migrants, long-term migrants 
will not learn Dutch. Because of the EU freedom of move-
ment, the Dutch state cannot require these migrants to sit 
a civic integration exam. However in response to parlia-
mentary questions the minister of the interior noted that in 
2010 more than 4,000 Polish migrants voluntarily partici-
pated in civic integration programs.58
Notes
1 Publicists Paul Scheffer’ essay “the multicultural drama” pub-
lished in the newspaper NRC Handelsblad in January 2000 
sparked a lot of discussion. http://vorige.nrc.nl/binnenland/ar-
ticle1572053.ece.
2 For example, in Germany a similar program came into effect in 
2005 (Integrationskurse) and in France in 2007 (contrat d’accueil 
et d’intégration). See Michalowski (2007) and Joppke (2007).
3 Data from the Statistical Institute of the Netherlands (CBS); data 
on religions: Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)
4 An allochtoon is a person who has at least one foreign-born par-
ent. The term covers both foreigners and Dutch citizens. See 
paragraph on “Immigrant Population” for details.
5 Dutch statistics differentiate between Western and non-Western 
immigrants. Western immigrants come from Europe (excluding 
Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia and Japan. Non-
Western immigrants come from Turkey, Africa, Latin America and 
the rest of Asia.
6 Share of employed and unemployed labor force (age 15-65) as a 
share of the total labor force.
7 Lucassen/Penninx (1997).
8 Jennissen (2011).
9 Malukans live on the Maluku Islands in western Indonesia. Ma-
lukan soldiers fought with the Dutch army against Indonesian 
independence. The Dutch government had promised them an 
independent Malukan state on the island Ambon. Because In-
donesia was not willing to create such a state, 12,500 Malukans 
came to the Netherlands to wait for its creation. To this day there 
is no free Malukan republic, and the Malukans have stayed in the 
Netherlands.
10 Family reunification is when children and spouses who were left 
behind at the time of migration come to join the principal migrant. 
Family formation is when a migrant comes to the Netherlands 
to live with their partner for the first time. The latter are often 
referred to as “marriage migrants”.
11 This number concerns the first and second generation.
12 Except for 1967 when the oil embargo put a halt to guest worker 
recruitment.
13 Jennissen (2011).
14 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, United King-
dom, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland.
15 Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Hungary.
16 These countries joined the EU in 2007.
17 In July 2014 this was €17,942.40 a year (equal to the legal mini-
mum wage), or €16,148.16 for single parents. 
18 Chakroun vs Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Case 
C-578/08.
19 For information on the exam (also in English) see http://www.
naarnederland.nl/.
20 See e.g. Leerkes/Kulu-Glasgow (2012).
21 Jennissen (2011).
22 See also Carol et al (2014).
23 In 2014, the minimum income is €27,565.92 a year, compared to 
€38,465,28 for highly-skilled workers under 30 and €52,462.08 
for those aged 30 or over.
24 For information in English see https://ind.nl/EN/individuals/res-
idence-wizard/work/orientation-year-highly-educated-persons/
Pages/default.aspx.
25 A 2007 report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy 
(WRR) on Dutch Identity (Identificatie met Nederland) recom-
mended that the term allochtoon be abolished, because it contin-
ues to define people of immigrant descent as not belonging to the 
Netherlands (“niet van hier”). The Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research (SCP) has dropped the term from its publications. The 
term is still employed by other government bodies, politicians, 
and journalists, although the term “migranten” (migrants) is slow-
ly gaining popularity.
26 The data presented include both people who do not possess 
Dutch citizenship and those who possess a foreign nationality in 
addition to their Dutch nationality (dual nationals).
27 Of these 190 nationalities, there are 127 nationalities with at 
least 100 members in the Netherlands, and 88 nationalities with 
at least 500 people.
28 CBS (2012): Jaarrapport integratie 2012.
29 Indonesian immigrants were an exception, as the government 
realized early on that their stay would be permanent. As part of 
an effort to assimilate them, social workers were assigned to help 
the families integrate into Dutch society. 
30 The Netherlands has a complicated school system. There are 
state schools (openbare scholen) that are entirely subsidized by 
the government and special schools (bijzonder onderwijs), which 
are based on religious belonging. The latter are entitled to the 
same funds as state schools plus additional funds from parents. 
They have the right to refuse students because they are not of 
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the right religion. Freedom of education is part of the constitution 
(Section 23).
31 A notable exception is Frits Bolkestein, the leader of the right-
wing liberal party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Peo-
ple’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD), who from the 
early 1990s expressed concerns about the compatibility of Islam 
with Dutch culture.
32 See also Michalowski (2005).




35 In 1984, the responsible junior minister declared that “identifi-
cation with the Dutch people and history is not necessary” nor 
“letting go of the own culture and no longer feeling especially 
involved with the weal and woe of his country of origin” (quoted in 
Heijs (1995), p. 193).
36 The naturalization rate is the number of naturalizations divided 
by the number of foreign nationals, i.e. the naturalization poten-
tial. People who acquire Dutch citizenship via option (i.e. second 
generation or marriage) are excluded.
37 See Michalowski (2011) for an interesting analysis of the content 
of the test. 
38 SCP (2009): Jaarrapport Integratie 2009.
39 SCP (2013): Jaarrapport Integratie 2013.
40 SCP (2009): Jaarrapport Integratie 2009.
41 Andriessen/Nievers/Faulk/Dagevos (2010).
42 SCP (2013): Jaarrapport Integratie 2013.
43 Secondary education in the Netherlands is tiered. Students are 
streamed into a tier based on a test taken in their final year at 
elementary school at age 12. There are three vocational tiers, 
(VMBO basis, kader and gemengd), a mid-range tier between 
vocation and academic (VMBO theoretische leerweg) and two 
academic tiers. HAVO is the lower academic tier leading to a 
hogeschool (university of applied sciences), and VWO the higher 
academic tier preparing for university.
44 CBS (2012): Jaarrapport Integratie 2012.
45 SCP (2011): Jaarrapport Integratie 2011.
46 Racial profiling occurs when a person is treated as a suspect 
based on his ethnicity, nationality or religion, instead of on evi-




50 De Boom/Leerkes/Engbersen (2011).
51 “Asylum seekers” are people who come to the Netherlands to 
seek asylum. If their claim is accepted, they receive a residence 
permit. “Refugees” are people who have successfully applied for 
asylum.
52 The amnesty was both for people whose claims had been re-
jected and people still in appeals.
53 Huijnk/Dagevos (2012).
54 Huijnk/Dagevos (2012).
55 “Opportunisten-kabinet bestraft”, March 21 2014, editorial
56 Huijnk/Dagevos (2012).
57 Final report by the parliamentary enquiry “Lessons from recent 
labor migration” (Parlementair onderzoek Lessen uit recente art-
beidsmigratie), TK 2011-2012, 32680 nr 4.
58 TK 2011-2012, 257.
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